Trends in Pro Forma reporting during the Great Recession by Mivshek, Dakota W
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2013
Trends in Pro Forma reporting during the Great
Recession
Dakota W. Mivshek
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mivshek, Dakota W., "Trends in Pro Forma reporting during the Great Recession" (2013). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 683.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/683
1 
 
CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
 
TRENDS IN PRO FORMA REPORTING DURING THE GREAT RECESSION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
PROFESSOR MATTHEW MAGILKE 
AND  
DEAN GREGORY HESS 
BY 
DAKOTA W. MIVSHEK 
 
 
 
FOR 
SENIOR THESIS 
SPRING 2013 
APRIL 29, 2013 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
3 
 
Acknowledgements 
 First and foremost, I would like to thank Professor Magilke for all his help 
throughout the course of this study. He was kind enough to be my advisor although he 
was on sabbatical for the semester. Without his help in developing a topic and advising 
me along the way, the study would not have gone so well. I would also like to thank 
Professor Batta for his help. We did not meet during the semester while conducting this 
study, but he helped me immensely in finding a topic to work with during my fall 
semester. I would also like to extend a huge thank you to Professor Antecol. As my Econ 
180 teacher she went above and beyond in editing my thesis, and providing much needed 
help along the way. Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends for all their 
support during my long journey from Colorado, to Phillips Exeter, to the University of 
Portland, and ultimately, the best college in the nation, Claremont McKenna College. 
Without all the great people in my life, my experience would not have been the same. 
Thank You.  
 
  
4 
 
Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................................................ 5 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 6 
2. Background .............................................................................................................................. 8 
3. Literature Review ................................................................................................................... 11 
4. Data ........................................................................................................................................ 16 
5. Methodological Approach and Results .................................................................................. 18 
5.1 Hypothesis 1: Proportion of Disclosers ................................................................................. 18 
5.2 Hypothesis 2: Magnitudes of Disclosers ............................................................................... 22 
5.3 Hypothesis 3: Drivers Behind Magnitudes ........................................................................... 25 
6. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 31 
Appendix ........................................................................................................................................ 33 
Tables ............................................................................................................................................. 34 
Tables ............................................................................................................................................. 35 
References ..................................................................................................................................... 38 
 
  
 
  
5 
 
Abstract 
 
Pro forma EPS reporting is a fairly new accounting disclosure; it has since been 
modified in 2003 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, to include additional 
disclosure and filing requirements. This “Regulation G” has been around for nearly a 
decade and since that time a major financial crises in the United States has occurred. 
This study attempts to analyze trends in pro forma EPS reporting within the S & P 500 
constituents during the Great Recession, and speculate as to whether earnings 
management was apparent. This study provides evidence that there was a significant 
increase in the proportion of pro forma disclosers and magnitudes of those disclosers. 
Results also indicate that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have a 
significant effect on the magnitude of these differences and that there appears to be a 
level of consistency in pro forma reporting among firms. Results allude to the possibility 
of short term and long term earnings management strategies during the Great recession 
among S & P 500 constituents.   
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1. Introduction 
 
 The purpose of this study is to add to the existing literature by looking at the 
effects the Great Recession had on pro-forma numbers and to speculate what may explain 
the trends seen in the results. For over two decades, an ongoing debate between two 
different profitability reporting measures, GAAP and “pro-forma”, has raged on. Pro 
forma earnings became a platform for companies to recast earnings to portray to investors 
a reported measure that more closely identified “core” earnings that they expected to 
carry on through the future.
1
 Over time, security analysts, investors, in addition to the 
press have increasingly been relying on these pro forma earnings to base decisions. 
However, the increasing gap between GAAP EPS and pro forma EPS has become a 
subtle form of earnings management
2
.  
When the dot-com bubble burst, companies such as Enron were prime examples 
of the risks investors faced in observing pro forma earnings. Enron showed a much 
healthier financial picture via deceitful reconciliation of pro forma figures. Enron was the 
catalyst that forced the SEC to step in and implement regulations to protect investors 
from companies wrongly increasing earnings via pro-forma announcements. In 2002, in 
conjunction with Sarbanes-Oxley, Regulation G was passed that forced companies to 
clearly show how they got to their pro-forma number. Research that was conducted post-
regulation show a decrease in shady pro-forma announcements; however, it is clear that 
companies are continuing to find ways around regulations to mislead investors. It has 
                                                          
1
 Phillips, T., M. Luehlfing, and C. Vallario. 2002. Hazy reporting. Journal of Accountancy (August): 
47.50 
2
 Bradshaw, M., Sloan, R., 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of two 
alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 41–66 
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been over a decade since regulation G was put in place. To the best of my knowledge, 
previous studies have not looked at trends in pro forma figures during tough economic 
times.  
 This study provides evidence that there was a significant increase in the 
proportion of pro forma disclosers and the magnitudes of those disclosers, as well as, 
results indicating that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have a significant 
effect on the magnitude of these differences seen between pro forma and GAAP.  
 This study contributes to the current literature in several ways. In particular, since 
the proliferation of pro forma earnings, three US economic recessions have occurred, and 
no study has specifically looked at pro forma trends during these times. Pro forma 
earnings were rare and fairly new during the early 1990s economic downturn, and the 
regulations put in place during the economic recession of the early 2000s may have 
curbed any trends that existed. The recent Great Recession provides a setting far enough 
removed from Regulation G to observe possible earnings manipulation via pro forma 
announcements. This study also contributes to literature related to the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, and the lasting effects of Regulation G.  
My results point to the importance of reminding financial statement users of the 
tricky details that lie within footnotes, which can be so easily overlooked. My results 
suggest that the pressures of economic decline may be a catalyst to bring managers back 
to their bad habits of opportunistic behavior, and my study opens up more room for future 
research to dive deeper.  
The remainder of the study is as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present a brief 
background to the pro forma debate and prior literature on the topic, respectively. Section 
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4 describes the data. The methodology and results are presented in Section 5. The final 
section concludes.   
  
2. Background 
 
 Pro-forma, or “street earnings”, became relevant in the early 1990s as many dot-
com companies began to adjust their audited GAAP earnings for items they deemed to be 
“unusual” or “non-recurring” and irrelevant to their “core” earnings. In many cases 
“street” earnings do illustrate a clearer picture of the actual earnings potential of a 
company. Companies must adhere to GAAP which enforces much stricter rules when 
reporting earnings. The idea behind pro forma is to allow companies to exclude some 
non-cash or one-time cash expenses such as depreciation, goodwill, amortization, 
restructuring, merger costs, stock based employee pay, and other transitory items that 
would help investors see the true operating potential.  
However, over time, understanding what went on to arrive at pro forma earnings 
became hazier. SEC chairman Harvey Pitt was often outspoken about the pro forma 
practice, complaining that there is no comparability, therefore no investor, especially an 
ordinary investor can read these in a way that is useful.
3
 Leading up to the dot-com 
bubble burst in the early 2000s, research was beginning to indicate that managers were 
using pro forma earnings opportunistically. In 1992, within the S&P 500, only 31 
companies reported any pro forma earnings that differed from GAAP; by 1999 more than 
                                                          
3
 Levinsohn, A. 2002. Popularity of pro forma  earnings prompts reform. Strategic Finance 83: 63.65. 
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half had played the pro forma game.
4
 The difference between GAAP and pro forma hit an 
all-time high during 2001.  
 The early 2000s marked a slowdown in the US economy. The unregulated pro 
forma practice allowed companies to try and avoid reporting bad earnings. In the two 
weeks ending September 7, 2001, the Nasdaq lost 12 percent and this collapse was 
blamed, in part, on the inflated valuation based on accounting smoke and mirrors.
5
 
Despite the critics and the lack of comparability, pro forma was here to stay. As Liesman 
and Weil reported, “pro forma is the profitability figure most widely watched by Wall 
Street analysts and many investors; when a company announces earnings that meet or 
beat ‘the street’ it tends to be a significant factor in moving the stock price.”6 It was 
becoming clear that regulation was needed. 
 In response to the exploitation of non-GAAP reporting, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) included in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Section 401 
(b); commonly referred to as Regulation G. This new rule, which went into effect in 
March 2003, required that: (1) a pro forma report cannot omit any information that would 
make the report in any way misleading to investors, and (2) a pro forma announcement 
must provide a complete reconciliation between the pro forma figure and the GAAP 
number
7
. Research conducted in the immediate years following Regulation G indicate 
that the legislation succeeded, by producing modest declines in frequency as well as 
                                                          
4
 Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & 
Sons, 2003. Print. 
5
 Dreman, D. 2001. Fantasy earnings. Forbes (October 1). 
6
Liesman, S., and J. Weil. 2001. Different views of .special items lead to various figures for S&P 500 
profit.Wall Street Journal (August 24). 
7
 Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean, 
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003). 
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magnitudes of pro forma reporting.
8
 On the other hand, to some, the SEC intervention 
may have caused an unforeseen cost; managers, afraid of scrutiny, are less transparent in 
terms of informing investors.  
 Regulation G has been in place for nearly 10 years and several recent empirical 
studies have attempted to analyze the lasting effects of the legislation. The results have 
been mixed; while studies have shown that opportunistic behavior is curbed to an extent, 
managers are becoming more creative with their disclosures, and pro forma vs GAAP 
differences are once again on the rise. 
9
 
 This study focuses on the trends in pro forma reporting post-regulation with an 
emphasis on activity during the Great Recession. Analysis shows, using Benford’s Law10 
that during recessionary times since 1950, reported financial statement numbers fail to 
conform to Benford’s Law, indicating increased levels of intentional manipulation.11 The 
intuition is as follows: management faces increased pressure during tough economic 
times, and that Regulation G may have outlived its initial scare, creating the strong 
possibility that earnings manipulation is apparent via pro forma earnings announcements 
during the Great Recession. Moreover, I examine the characteristics of the pro forma 
reporting firms. 
 This study analyzes the trends of pro forma reporting by looking at the 
constituents of the S&P 500 for years 2007-2011. During the early 2000s, the last US 
                                                          
8
 Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures. 
Working paper, Florida State University and Purdue University. 
9 McVay, S., 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core 
earnings and special items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501–531. 
10
 A mathematical law that predicts the frequency of naturally occurring numbers 
11
 Tilden, Christi, and Troy Janes. "Empirical Evidence of Financial Statement Manipulation during 
Economic Recessions." Journal of Finance and Accountancy (2012): n. pag. Web. 
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recession, the difference between GAAP earnings and pro forma earnings reached an all-
time high; amounting to nearly a $170 billion dollar earnings gap.
12
 Pro forma earnings 
have not been around long enough to look back on other recessions. Have pro forma 
earnings once again become a moral hazard? There is a right and wrong way to use pro 
forma reporting. Whether management has fallen back into the pattern of excluding “all 
the bad things” and whether these behaviors are intensified during recessionary times is 
the crux of what is being looked at in this study. If the earnings gap represents a subtle 
form of earnings management it could have important implications on financial statement 
users, managers, regulators, and other practitioners.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 
To the best of my knowledge, to date, no literature exists that examines pro forma 
trends with respect to the latest financial crisis. Prior research tends to focus on pro forma 
pre/post Regulation G, the usefulness of pro forma reporting, the dangers of pro forma 
reporting, the characteristics of pro forma reporters, previous trends, as well as, the nature 
of management behavior and accounting manipulation during recessionary times. These 
studies, which are discussed in greater detail below, shed light on why this subtle form of 
accounting manipulation could be more prevalent during recessionary times.  
Prior to regulation (pre 2002), pro forma earnings had no accepted definition; 
therefore, it was difficult to see the purpose of pro forma reporting. However, as stated 
                                                          
12
 Schlank, Rosemary. "AccountingWEB." Investors See Record Gaps in Pro Forma vs. GAAP Earnings. 
N.p., 30 Jan. 2002. Web. 04 Jan. 2013. 
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earlier, investors primarily looked at pro forma earnings for valuation. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2003) investigates the relative informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings. 
They find, by using short window abnormal returns around earnings announcements, that 
pro forma earnings are significantly more informative than GAAP earnings with respect 
to future earnings potential.
13
 In a follow-up study, Bhattacharya et al. (2003) conclude 
that some managers employ these disclosures opportunistically. Doyle et al. (2003) find 
that some excluded expenses from “street” earnings are predictive of lower future cash 
flows, indicating that managers falsely classify some recurring expenses as non-recurring 
expenses. So while it is clear that pro forma earnings are useful to analysts and investors; 
evidence suggests that pro forma earnings are also a vehicle used by managers to 
manipulate earnings.    
The opportunistic nature of pro forma earnings shows another alarming trend; a 
disproportionate number of firms that were just meeting or beating analyst earnings 
forecasts.
14
 Evidence leading up to regulation for years 1998-2001, revealed 80 percent of 
pro forma announcers were meeting or exceeding analyst forecasts, while only 39 percent 
of these same firms were meeting or exceeding forecasts when using GAAP earnings.
15
 
The growing complexity and length of 10-Ks were forcing many investors to accept what 
management was reporting. Although it seemed as though “everyone” is doing it; there is 
                                                          
13 Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T., Larson, C., 2003. Assessing the relative 
informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 285–319. 
14 Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts? Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University. 
15 Bhattacharya, N., Black, E., Christensen, T., Larson, C., 2003. Assessing the relative 
informativeness and permanence of pro forma earnings and GAAP operating earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 36, 285–319. 
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generally a typical pro forma announcer profile. Pro forma announcers tend to be 
relatively young firms, concentrated in the technology and business services industries. 
They typically carry more debt, and are significantly less profitable than other firms in 
their respective industries.
16
 This is the typical profile for pro forma abusers; however, as 
First Call’s research Chief, Chuck Hill stated in 2002, “It’s snowballing—we’re seeing 
more and more companies reporting their earnings in numerous different ways, and 
analysts are going along with it.
17” 
 Prior to regulation, manager recommendations on exclusions were not easy for 
auditors or analysts to refute because, in most cases, they were not easy to understand. Gu 
and Chen (2004), find that analysts were fairly skilled in reversing some of the more 
egregious exclusions brought forth by managers but could not completely unwind or 
catch other more hidden exclusions. The biggest challenge for auditors and analysts alike 
is flushing out the exact amount that the exclusion should be. Determining whether an 
item is recurring or non-recurring is not black and white; professional judgment is 
typically necessary. Gu and Chen (2004) show that although analysts appear to have the 
skills to help mediate GAAP and pro forma earnings, it is not a perfect science, and 
accounting items themselves are hard to classify when it comes to valuation effects 
moving forward. The most typical exclusions are restructuring charges, acquisitions 
expenses, and “other” categories. Expenses falling under the umbrella of “other” are 
especially hard to deconstruct.   
                                                          
16 Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean, 
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003). 
17
Bradshaw, M., Sloan, R., 2002. GAAP versus the Street: An empirical assessment of two 
alternative definitions of earnings. Journal of Accounting Research 40, 41–66. 
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 As expected, Regulation G provided much needed guidance in helping investors 
understand the pro forma figure that companies presented. Entwistle et al. (2006) looks at 
the effects of Regulation G within the scope of the S&P 500. They find from hand 
collected quarterly releases, the proportion of pro forma announcers dropped from 77 to 
54 percent, and the magnitudes are smaller, indicating reporting in a potentially less 
suspicious way.  Heflin and Hsu (2005), who take a broader approach and observe the 
effects of Regulation G across thousands of firms, find that Regulation G produced 
“modest” declines in frequency of pro forma announcers, a decline in exclusion 
magnitude, as well as a decline in the probability that pro forma earnings meet or beat 
analyst forecasts. These findings indicate a positive effect brought forward by Sarbanes-
Oxley; it would appear the managers decreased their opportunistic behavior. Such 
evidence also helped show that the past (pre-regulation) is littered with opportunistic 
management behavior.  
 Regulation G curtailed some opportunistic behavior, but did not provide an 
answer to solve all problems within the pro forma playing field. One unintended 
consequence is that the regulations seem to shy companies away from reporting pro 
forma figures when they would have been most useful.
18
 Regulation G made 
reconciliation to pro forma figures transparent but also very costly. Some companies 
elected to only report GAAP earnings when they had special items on their books that 
would have employed the use of a more useful non-GAAP earnings figure. Aside from 
scaring companies away, studies in the late 2000s are showing that the effects of 
                                                          
18 Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures. 
Working paper, Florida State University and Purdue University. 
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regulation were wearing off. Since Q1 of 2003, income increasing exclusions have been 
on a steady rise.
19
 Other studies show that managers are getting more creative with their 
exclusions. McVay (2006), finds evidence of more recurring expenses being shifted to 
other more mysterious accounts such as “other”, or “special items.” The average 10-K is 
now well over 100 pages long and full of confusing footnotes; it is no surprise managers 
are continuing to find other ways to increase the bottom line.  
 The behaviors of managers during economic downturns as well as booms have 
been studied in relation to earnings manipulation for decades. In general, the findings 
have been mixed; however what is understood is the underlying motivations of managers. 
Managers face pressures from external sources (analysts’ forecasts, contractual 
obligations, stock market perceptions, etc.), from company culture attributes 
(stockholders, management compensation, company goals, etc.), and also from other 
miscellaneous sources (personal bonuses, political reasons, etc.). Recent studies show 
that managers do not all act similarly during economic downturns. Tilden and Janes 
(2012) find increased levels of manipulation during recessionary times since 1950; while 
Strobl (2008), find that the most severe earnings manipulation occurred during times of 
economic prosperity. Strobl suggests that during economic downturns, investors expect 
some degree of accounting manipulation and therefore put less emphasis on released 
reports, which makes incentives low for managers deciding to engage in earnings 
manipulation. Strobl also suggests that stricter disclosure regulations lead to more 
manipulation. On the other hand, Lin & Shih (1994), find strong evidence of 
                                                          
19 Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts? Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University. 
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manipulation during the 1990-1991 US recession. They also suggest that there may be a 
threshold that managers hit during economic downturns that ultimately determines the 
degree of manipulation; if managers have no chance of receiving bonuses and feel as 
though the company is unable to be saved, they will defer income for the purpose of 
manipulating earnings in a future period, but if they are on the threshold they may work 
to manage earnings to get out of the hole. Alarmingly, some of the most advanced 
accounting manipulations via pro forma earnings have a long run outlook. Earnings 
reserves are kept in arbitrary accounts to be strategically released in the future, for the 
purpose of long-run maximization.  
4. Data 
 
This study explores whether pro forma earnings reporting behavior changes over 
the time period of 2007-2011. The primary interest is identifying trends in firms’ pro 
forma reporting behavior. I use data on firms that make up the S&P 500 for years 2007-
2011.  
Pro forma figures are typically found within quarterly press releases. Data is 
obtained from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). For the purpose of this study, 
I/B/E/S actual quarterly earnings are used to proxy for the non-GAAP earnings figure 
disclosed by managers in the press releases. It should be noted that, I/B/E/S actual 
earnings serves as only a proxy. Prior research has shown that analysts tend to exclude 
the more transitory items from earnings, and that the nonrecurring items they include in 
17 
 
actual earnings are more persistent and have higher valuation multiples than the expenses 
they exclude from actual earnings (Gu and Chen, 2004).  
All remaining variables, including quarterly GAAP Earnings per share and 
control variables, are from Compustat data. The data covers the 20 fiscal quarters 
beginning with Q1 2007 and ending with Q4 2011. Constituents of the S & P 500 change 
year to year, therefore only companies that are members of the S & P 500 from Q1 2007- 
Q4 2011 are observed. While this limits my data and may cause some survivorship bias,  
this time period allows for ample time before and after the S&P 500 index hit rock 
bottom on March 6, 2009. Given some quarters did not have data for a firm, the sample is 
includes 442 firms and 8,840 quarter observations. 
 The dependent variable is defined as the difference between I/B/E/S actual 
earnings and GAAP (DIFF).  I argue that this dependent variable is best suited for 
examining trends in pro forma reporting because it is the most easily quantifiable metric 
for understanding discrepancies in pro forma and GAAP earnings numbers.  
Assuming trends of pro forma reporters have, for the most part, not changed since 
the early 2000s, important variables to control for are: firm size, intangibles (as 
percentage of total assets), debt levels, profitability, quarter in which reporting, and 
amount of special items reported. These serve as the independent variables that are used 
in hypothesis 3.  
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the average difference between pro forma 
and GAAP per year (2007-2011) and for the independent variables. Over the five years, 
on average, the difference for constituents of the S&P 500 is about $0.11. As predicted, 
the peak of this difference is in 2008, the lead up year to rock bottom of the financial 
18 
 
crisis, $0.23. Panel B, graphically depicts this trend over the 20 observed quarters. During 
the 4
th
 quarter of 2008, the biggest difference in these two values is $0.56. This same 
quarter is the only time in which the average GAAP EPS is negative ($0.27).  The S&P 
500 consists of 500 companies that are leading companies in market capitalization on the 
U.S. stock market, thus unsurprisingly Table 1 reveals that the firms included in this 
analysis are generally very large firms, with mean total assets of just over $50 Billion, the 
largest being Bank of America during the third quarter of 2010 ($2.36T), and the smallest 
being First Solar Inc during the first quarter of 2007 ($618 Million). Of these firms, the 
average percentage of intangibles as a part of total assets is around 20 percent and 
average leverage is 1.61 percent. Of the 8,840 firm quarter observations over five years, 
just under 11 percent, or around 840 firm quarter observations displayed GAAP losses.  
   
5. Methodological Approach and Results 
 
5.1 Hypothesis 1: Proportion of Disclosers 
 
When disclosing financial results, a firm must consider whether to report a pro 
forma figure, and if so how to calculate the pro forma figure. As mentioned, the central 
issue in this paper is how these disclosure decisions have been affected by the presence of 
a major economic recession. Prior studies have documented an association between 
earnings management and declining firm performance. I have also discussed earlier the 
multitude of pressures that fall on management during tougher economic times, such as 
analysts’ forecasts, contractual obligations, and stock market perceptions. Earnings 
19 
 
management has been uncovered for years; however, what may be alarming to investors 
is the fact that, presumably, some earnings management goes undetected. After regulation 
in 2002, of which the purpose was not to eliminate pro forma reporting, but simply to call 
for a clear reconciliation of how the firm arrived at a figure, we saw a decrease in the 
proportion of firms reporting any non-GAAP figure.
20
 It would appear as though 
regulation discouraged managers using pro forma figures opportunistically otherwise no 
decline should have been observed. Unfortunately, since the modest decline in frequency 
in the immediate years after Regulation G, pro forma reporting has been on the rise again; 
a steady rise has been seen in the percentage of firms reporting pro forma figures since 
2003.
21
 Because managers have the right to report pro forma figures when they deem 
necessary this may not necessarily signify earnings management is on the rise. As Gu and 
Chen (2004) find in their sample of 28,542 quarterly footnote entries, the most common 
non-recurring items included in pro forma reconciliations are: restructuring charges 
(22%), other (15%), acquisition expenses (14%), and asset sale gain (11%). Restructuring 
charges are typically incurred when a company is not doing well and must close down 
plants, lay off workers, etc. To that end, an economic recession therefore could very well 
see an increase in pro forma reporting due to a slew of restructuring charges within 
struggling companies. With that said, however; prior research has shown the 
sophistication of managers who use large “restructuring charges” or similar accounts tend 
                                                          
20 Heflin, F., Hsu, C., 2005. The impact of the SEC’s regulation of non-GAAP disclosures. Working paper, 
Florida State University and Purdue University. 
21 Doyle, J., Soliman, M., 2011. Do managers define “Street” earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts? 
Working paper, University of Utah and Stanford University. 
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to overestimate the write down initially, only to reverse them in the future.
22
 When these 
charges are overestimated early, they can provide a cushion for the future when earnings 
fall just short; investors rarely look at the history of these charges.
23
 I expect the 
proportion of firms to continue to rise through the recession because of the presence of an 
economic downturn, as well as, possible earnings management. When thinking about the 
proportion of firms reporting non-GAAP figures and the behavior of management, this 
leads to the first hypothesis.  
 
H1: The percentage of firms disclosing pro forma earnings should increase from Q1 2007 
to Q1 2009. 
 
Whether or not firms are employing earnings management, the presence of an 
economic recession should induce an increase in firms disclosing pro forma earnings. To 
the extent an increase is attributed to economic conditions or earnings management is a 
question analyzed in detail in the results below.  
This study also pays close attention to the behavior of pro forma reporting after 
Q1 2009. If the first hypothesis holds true, and then pro forma reporting decreases, then 
only to rise again in a bimodal fashion, one may assume some previous large exclusions 
are being slowly reversed in the future.  
I test H1— In the appendix, in Panel A, you see the graphical depiction and table 
of the results. Since, I am interested in seeing the effect of income increasing exclusions, 
                                                          
22
 Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & 
Sons, 2003. Print. 
23
 Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & 
Sons, 2003. Print. 
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I only count the firm as a pro forma reporter if the pro forma number exceeded the GAAP 
EPS. In very few cases, GAAP actually exceeds pro forma; these were left out of the 
analysis because they represent the minority of differences and are not consistent with the 
goal of this paper. Heflin and Hsu (2008) found that the average percentage of firms that 
disclose income increasing exclusions since regulation (2002-2007) is around 45%. 
Therefore, 45% serves as the population proportion. I then use hypothesis testing for a 
population proportion on each quarter; H0: p = 45%, and H1: p > 45%. Looking at the 
table, quarterly observations in bold represent observations that were significant at the 
5% level.  
By looking at the graph and table in Panel A, it is easy to see that since 2007, the 
percentage of pro forma reporters clearly increased. What is interesting, and a trend that I 
will dive into more discussion about later, is the rise seen in 2011, after a decline in 2010. 
The increased number of disclosers leading up to the rock bottom (Q1 2009) is much less 
intriguing, than the increased number of disclosers since Q4 2010. 
Of the 20 quarters observed, more than half (11) had a significant increase in 
disclosers from the baseline of 45% observed from years 2002-2007. Of the five fourth 
quarter observations, four of them had a significant increase in disclosers. Q4 2008 was 
the quarter right before the S & P 500 hit rock bottom, and also the quarter that had the 
highest number of income increasing disclosures, 55%. H1 was a good launching point to 
observe that indeed the pro forma environment was being affected by the recession; H2 
and H3 provide further descriptive evidence of this trend.  
 
22 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 2: Magnitudes of Disclosers 
 
Similar to the above hypothesis, the interest is in the sheer difference between 
GAAP and non-GAAP earnings. When firms decide whether to disclose pro forma 
earnings, managers must also decide what GAAP income components to exclude. If pro 
forma reporting is used more frequently during the Great Recession, casual empiricism 
suggests that the average difference between GAAP and non-GAAP figures should 
increase along with the percentage of firms disclosing. Recent evidence shows that since 
regulation firms have become more creative in where they hide transitory items.
24
  This 
practice would enable pro forma reporters to add more exclusions to income increasing 
adjustments. The pressures put upon management would give firms incentives to be sure 
to maximize their exclusions when disclosing pro forma figures. I believe that not only 
will the percentage of disclosers increase, but the magnitudes of difference will increase 
as well because of the presence of earnings management. Therefore, to observe trends in 
pro forma reporting, magnitudes of exclusions must be taken into account, and this leads 
to hypothesis two: 
 
H2: The magnitude of the difference between GAAP and pro forma earnings should 
increase from Q1 2007 to Q1 2009.   
 
                                                          
24 McVay, S., 2006. Earnings management using classification shifting: An examination of core earnings 
and special items. The Accounting Review, 81, 501–531. 
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Similar to H1, special attention is paid to whether there are continuing trends after 
Q1 2009. If magnitudes increase, there could be signs of the sophisticated strategies 
employed by managers as mentioned earlier.  
I test H2— in the appendix; Panel B and accompanying tables show the results to 
H2. H1 shows that there were now more pro forma reporters, but that did not necessarily 
mean higher magnitudes of exclusions. Prior research showed that magnitudes decreased 
after the introduction of Regulation G, but what effect would a recession have? The graph 
in Panel B tells the story. The levels seen before the recession and after the introduction 
of Regulation G, namely years 2002-2007, were magnitudes between $0.02-$0.06. The 
graph shows that the turbulent trend of exclusion magnitudes, reaching at times $0.56 
(2008 Q4), have not since returned to pre-recessionary levels as of the end of 2011.  
In terms of my hypothesis, I find an increase in exclusion magnitudes from Q1 
2007 to Q1 2009; however, what is interesting is the most significant differences from the 
baseline quarter of Q1 2007, are not in the year 2009
25
 (besides the quarter of interest Q1 
2009), but instead in years 2008 and 2011; please refer to the tables within Panel B. In 
terms of the most significant exclusion magnitude differences compared to Q1 2007, I 
observe a significant difference in Q3 2008, Q4 2008, Q1 2009, and Q4 2011. And in 
terms of the most significant exclusion magnitude differences compared to the year 2007, 
I see a significant difference in 2008, 2009, and 2011.  
These observations lent me to sift through prior literature that might help tell the 
story behind these trends. One would wonder why, during 2010, well within the range of 
                                                          
25
 March 9, 2009 was when the S & P 500 index hit rock bottom at 676.53 
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the financial crises, there were mild differences in exclusion magnitudes between GAAP 
and pro forma. And why did 2011 see such an increase in difference magnitudes?  
In the favor of appropriate manager exclusion decisions, the significant increase 
in the latter half of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 makes sense. As pointed out in the 
literature review section, Gu and Chen (2004), found that the most common non-
recurring items included in pro forma reconciliations are restructuring charges. 
Restructuring charges are most closely related to poor performance; when companies are 
closing down plants, laying off workers, etc. With that said, a significant amount of 
legitimate restructuring charges could have been excluded in arriving at pro forma 
figures; therefore, increasing the magnitudes during this time period.  
However, the restructuring charge reconciliation does not do well in explaining 
the difference in magnitudes seen in 2011. Proving any kind of earnings management 
during the years of 2008 and 2009 would be challenging, seeing as, legitimate one-time 
expenses could have prevailed, considering the economic environment. But how then, 
during 2011, a time of recovery, are “non-recurring” expenses once again on the rise? 
Well, as mentioned earlier, this evidence alludes to possible earnings management, very 
sophisticated earnings management. Without claiming earnings management, it is 
important to note a discovery prior literature has found in the use of “long-term” planning 
in pro forma reporting. Just after Regulation G, Arthur Levitt, former SEC chairman 
warned that the SEC had noticed a pattern of companies taking large restructuring 
charges, only to reverse some of those expenses later on in the future. The early 
overstatement of restructuring charges, allow companies to create a type of reserve, 
25 
 
hidden deep in the financials that can be called upon on a later date to boost earnings
26
. 
Although regulation G doesn’t allow companies to take the same “one-time” charge in 
consecutive years, companies are simply changing the names of the write-offs to get 
around this rule
27
. And as explained earlier, restructuring charges were the most common 
write off. At any rate, it appears that financial statement users need to view large 
“special” charges with a great deal of skepticism, because there could be a manager with 
a long term plan to make the company look better.  
 This story could be useful in understanding why there was a major difference in 
magnitudes seen during the beginning of the recession, a relatively mild period, and then 
once again a major difference in magnitudes during the recovery phase. It could be the 
possibility that managers were reversing these writes downs, in hopes of speeding up 
recovery. This of course is only speculation.  
 
5.3 Hypothesis 3: The Drivers Behind Magnitudes  
 
 Evidence shows that not only are pro forma disclosures used to opportunistically 
manage earnings, but the typical abusers have similar characteristics.
28
 Bhattacharya et. 
al. (2004) find from a sample size of 1,149 hand collected pro forma press 
announcements that pro forma reporters are typically in service industries (specifically 
                                                          
26 Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & 
Sons, 2003. Print. 
27 Leder, Michelle. Financial Fine Print: Uncovering a Company's True Value. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley & 
Sons, 2003. Print. 
28 Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean, 
Empirical Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003). 
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high tech), relatively young firms, large market cap firms, firms with relatively higher 
debt levels, less profitable, and firms with relatively high PE ratios. This sort of evidence 
helps establish the third hypothesis, and controls that should accompany the multivariate 
test.   
In practice, there are typically three major targets that tend to exist: (1) reporting a 
profit, (2) meeting or beating analyst’s expectations, and (3) avoiding an earnings 
decrease. In my preliminary observations, of the 442 companies over 20 different 
quarters, on average 89% post a profit in terms of GAAP (11% report a loss); and on 
average 93% post a profit in terms of pro forma (7% report a loss). This 4% difference 
suggests, of the 11% that report a loss on GAAP (49 companies), nearly 4% (18 
companies) manage to report a profit when it comes to pro forma. This shows a heavy 
importance of companies finding ways to report a positive earnings number. Please refer 
to Panel C in the appendix to see the graphical display. This sort of preliminary 
information led me to H3; negative earnings would be a major catalyst in determining the 
difference in magnitudes between GAAP and pro forma.   
 
H3: The largest driver in the differences in magnitude between GAAP-non-GAAP 
reporting should be whether a firm reported a loss for that quarterly observation 
 
To test the third hypothesis, I use cross sectional panel data and a random effects 
linear model. A random effects model allows me to most appropriately take into account 
that observations are taken over time on the same firms using the same units. Prior 
research has suggested the inclusion of other independent variables. Lougee and 
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Marquardt (2004) suggests that larger firms are more likely to disclose pro forma results 
different from GAAP, therefore, firm size is included as the natural log of total assets 
(LNASSET). Lougee and Marquardt also suggest that firms with higher leverage are 
more likely to disclose pro forma earnings, therefore, debt to equity ratios for each 
company are used (LEV). Following Heflin and Hsu (2008), intangible assets (INTANG) 
is included as the amount of intangible assets on the balance sheet for a firm as a 
percentage of total assets. Because exclusions arise from intangible assets in some cases, 
one expects firms with a high percentage of intangibles on the balance sheet to have, on 
average, a higher magnitude of difference.  
Two additional controls which are consistent with managers’ motivations and 
pressures faced in regards to firm performance, LOSS and Q4, respectively, are included 
in the analysis. These are both included as binary variables. LOSS equals 1 during any 
quarter observation in which GAAP earnings are negative and 0 otherwise. One expects 
that firms with GAAP losses should be more likely to increase the difference between 
their GAAP and pro forma number. Q4 equals 1 during any quarter observation that is 
during the fourth quarter of a fiscal year and 0 otherwise. Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) 
suggest managers face increased pressures during the fourth quarter.  
Finally, prior research suggests firms with special items and restructuring costs 
use these categories to increase pro forma figures (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002). SPEC, 
monetary amount of special items listed on the balance sheet, as well as, RESTRUCT, 
amount of restructuring costs for quarter, are used as two additional controls. The lag 
variable, denoted δ is the DIFF of the previous quarter regressed on the current quarter 
DIFF in order to see if there is a consistency among firms, possibly alluding to intent to 
28 
 
manage earnings; this will show the level of consistency in reporting pro forma figures; 
consistency in pro forma would be frowned upon, because pro forma earnings are 
described as “non-recurring”, so any level of consistency would suggest earnings 
management. More specifically, I estimate a model of the following form: 
                                           (RE) 
 
Where DIFF is the difference between I/B/E/S actual earnings and GAAP and individual 
firms are denoted by i and t denotes time. Year is a vector of year indicator variables 
(2007-2011, the left out category is 2007). FC is a vector of financial characteristics (i.e., 
LNASSETS, SPEC, INTANG, LOSS, LEV, RESTRUCT, q4). DIFFt-1 represents the lag 
variable for t-1 firm specific quarterly observations, and ε represents the usual residual, 
mean=0, uncorrelated with itself. The strength of a random effects model is the flexibility 
to give correct estimates in the presence of correlated errors that arise from a data 
hierarchy.  
The regression results can be seen in the Table 2 of the Appendix. Overall, the 
regression is a respectable predictor of the difference (DIFF) between pro forma and 
GAAP EPS, with 20% of the variation in differences being explained by the model.  
H2 is further strengthened by the regression results. As mentioned above, 
significant differences in magnitudes were seen during years 2008 and 2011, in relation 
to baseline year 2007. The regression results show the same. Years 2008 and 2009 are 
both significant at the 1% level. Compared to 2007, the difference (DIFF) between pro 
forma and GAAP increases on average by $0.14 (2008) and $0.11 (2011) for a firms’ 
quarterly EPS earnings announcement.  
29 
 
The coefficients on the variables are as I would expect and significant variables in 
determining the DIFF are some of the variables I would expect. Specifically, LOSS, 
which was my variable of interest in H3, is significant at the 1% level. My results 
indicate that, when firms report an operating GAAP loss, the difference (DIFF) between 
GAAP and pro forma will be, on average, $0.76. This magnitude of difference is quite 
alarming. This goes back to my theory that managers will do everything in their power to 
get out of the red, even if that means an EPS of zero.  
Prior to the results, a firm’s percentage of intangibles as a part of total assets was 
thought to have a positive effect on DIFF; that is, the more intangible heavy a firm is, the 
more likely they are to report a larger magnitude of difference in pro forma. As the 
results show, within the sample of S & P 500 firms, for every increase of one percent of 
intangibles, on average, the DIFF rises by $0.19. This lends support to prior literature that 
suggests that high tech firms, are in many cases the worst abusers of pro forma 
reconciliations.
29
 
Another set of significant independent variables were SPEC (special items) and 
RESTRUCT (restructuring costs). These were both significant at the 1% level; however, 
have coefficients that are so small that they do not affect DIFF as much as their p-values 
would suggest. The size of the firm (LNASSETS), amount of leverage in capital structure 
(LEV), and which quarter an observation came from (Q4), appears to have little effect on 
the difference in magnitudes reported.  
 Although I set out to explore the impact that LOSS had on DIFF, the most 
interesting variable and coefficient may be the DIFF L1—The lag variable. This was 
                                                          
29
 Bhattacharya, Neil, Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E. and Mergenthaler, Richard Dean, Empirical 
Evidence on Recent Trends in Pro Forma Reporting (August 2003). 
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included to gain a sense of what level of consistency did the same firm report pro forma 
figures different from GAAP figures. Considering that pro forma practice was meant to 
be a way for firms to limit their exposure to non-recurring items, it would suggest that no 
level of consistency should be apparent—the results suggest otherwise. Although I would 
expect some level of correlation between t and t-1, significance at the 1% level, and a 
coefficient of nearly $0.10 suggests there is a level of consistency of firms to report pro 
forma figures different from GAAP quarter over quarter.  
 One story behind this interesting result could be managers’ confidence that they 
could slide more past investors during a recessionary time. Until the Enron collapse, 
many had challenged, “What’s the big deal? Aren’t there always accounting related 
surprises in a recessionary economy?
30” This sort of attitude could lead managers to 
believe that they could consistently find expenses to exclude during this time because 
investors would simply understand that ‘everyone’ was doing poorly. Once again the 
long run strategies mentioned earlier would come into play. By taking consistent write 
downs and restructuring charges during times of little observance, reversals could be used 
in future periods in a slow drawn out way to attract less attention. This of course is only 
an idea and may not be the true nature of what was going on; however, future research 
could explore this idea further. Did managers use long term strategies during the Great 
Recession in terms of pro forma reporting to create reserves to draw upon in future time 
periods? 
 
                                                          
30 Schlank, Rosemary. "AccountingWEB." Investors See Record Gaps in Pro Forma vs. GAAP Earnings. 
N.p., 30 Jan. 2002. Web. 04 Jan. 2013. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
 Investors should think twice before accepting a pro forma earnings figure as truth 
before looking a little closer into the reconciliation of that figure. Prior studies, my study, 
and presumably future studies will continue to find some peculiar patterns in financial 
statements. It is up to the user to be aware of when there is possibility for deception, and 
up to others to help curb the deception on the part of managers. There is a lot that goes 
into accounting for a company, and the pressures of today’s financial environment can 
lead managers to do things they would not otherwise do.  
This study was not intended to make any bold conclusions as to whether earnings 
management was apparent during the Great Recession, nor to support or criticize the use 
of pro forma EPS; it was simply to shed light on trends in pro forma reporting seen 
during the financial crisis, and to speculate what may explain the trends seen in the 
results. The results have shown that there was indeed a significant increase in the 
proportion of pro forma disclosers and the magnitudes of those disclosers. Results from 
the regression have concluded that the presence of negative earnings and intangibles have 
a significant effect on the magnitude of difference between pro forma and GAAP. Results 
have also shown significant increases in magnitudes during years 2008 and 2011, as well 
as, a level of consistency in the lag variable. These results allude to a possible strategy of 
long-term earnings management, but more in depth research would be needed to make 
this conclusion.  
 The biggest limitation of this study is that I/B/E/S analyst estimates were used as 
a proxy for pro forma numbers. A hand-collected sample of press releases, as well as a 
32 
 
more diverse sample of firms would possibly solidify results. Future research in this topic 
could look to dive deeper to what exclusions were made during 2008, and if reversals of 
those exclusions were partly due to the apparent increase during 2011.  
 The pro forma debate will continue to rage on, as to whether it serves an 
important platform for companies to portray to investors a reported measure that more 
closely identifies “core” earnings; until then, more research will continue to look into not 
only the usefulness of pro forma reporting but also the integrity that lies behind it.  
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Panel A: Percentage of Pro Forma Disclosers 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Yr. Avg
2007 44% 40% 48% 48% 45%
2008 48% 48% 51% 55% 51%
2009 51% 49% 47% 50% 49%
2010 51% 47% 47% 51% 49%
2011 51% 52% 49% 53% 51%
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Panel B: Magnitude Trends 
GAAP
Pro Forma
Difference
DIFF Z stat Prob
2007 Q1 0.06$             Base
2007 Q2 0.02$             1.052 0.146
2007 Q3 0.01$             1.137 0.128
2007 Q4 0.01$             0.656 0.256
2008 Q1 0.04$             0.514 0.304
2008 Q2 0.12$             -1.124 0.130
2008 Q3 0.22$             -1.962 0.025 **
2008 Q4 0.56$             -3.714 0.000 ***
2009 Q1 0.15$             -1.750 0.040 **
2009 Q2 0.10$             -0.923 0.178
2009 Q3 0.04$             0.705 0.240
2009 Q4 0.05$             0.512 0.304
2010 Q1 0.07$             -0.144 0.443
2010 Q2 0.06$             0.135 0.446
2010 Q3 0.06$             0.191 0.424
2010 Q4 0.04$             0.695 0.243
2011 Q1 0.08$             -0.379 0.352
2011 Q2 0.11$             -0.751 0.226
2011 Q3 0.12$             -1.040 0.149
2011 Q4 0.21$             -2.031 0.021 **
Year DIFF Z stat Prob
2007 0.03$      Base
2008 0.23$      -4.475 0.000 ***
2009 0.08$      -1.982 0.024 **
2010 0.05$      -1.174 0.120
2011 0.14$      -3.071 0.001 ***
 
 
 
 
 
***P<0.01 
**P<0.05 
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y
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b
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b
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=
 l
ag
 v
ar
ia
b
le
, 
D
IF
F
 t-
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
36 
 
 
 
 
 (1) 
VARIABLES DIFF 
  
Year08 0.137*** 
 (0.0373) 
Year09 0.0113 
 (0.0374) 
Year10 0.0406 
 (0.0372) 
Year11 0.111*** 
 (0.0372) 
LNASSETS -0.00420 
 (0.00862) 
SPEC -0.000547*** 
 (1.61e-05) 
INTANG 0.187*** 
 (0.0563) 
LOSS 0.760*** 
 (0.0389) 
LEV -3.15e-05 
 (0.000136) 
RESTRUCT 0.00239*** 
 (0.000226) 
Q4 0.0313 
 (0.0255) 
L.DIFF 0.0991*** 
 (0.0100) 
Constant -0.0543 
 (0.0890) 
  
Observations 8,398 
Number of id_var 442 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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